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Michael Corballis has written a delightful book that makes an important contribution to 
our understanding of the emergence of our unique capacity to communicate using a 
verbal generative language. His central theme that our thought processes are recursive, 
and that this has led to the recursive nature of our verbal language, and hence its 
generative nature as first identified by Noam Chomsky. To his credit, Corballis does not 
buy into the entire Chomsky narrative – namely the notion that language suddenly 
appeared in homo sapiens due to a ‘somewhat miraculous’ and ‘singular event’ in one 
individual, whom Chomsky named Prometheus. Rather, Corballis suggests that language 
arose through natural selection, evolving into its present form through many twists and 
turns.  He also has much to say about the evolution of our species. 
 At the core of Corballis’ model of the origin of language is his argument that 
thought determined the nature of language, not the other way around.  He next argues that 
human language is unlike that of any other animal because our thought processes are 
unique.  We think recursively, as evidenced by two distinctive mental capabilities: we 
possess a theory of mind, and we are capable of time travel.  The former is simply our 
ability to understand that other humans think the way we do, and so to realise that they 
will understand us.  The latter is our ability to deal with things that are not immediately 
available to us in either space or time, to conceptualise that there is a past, a present and a 
future, and to act accordingly. Time travel is absolutely essential for planning for the 
future.  Non-human animals live totally in the present and actions in which they prepare 
for future events (burying nuts, building nests or dams, and so on) are all done 
instinctively and in unchanging patterns.  Human preparations for the future, on the other 
hand, constantly change depending on what is needed. 
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 Corballis argues that both time travel and a theory of mind involve recursive 
thinking. He claims that we humans reason as follows: if I think along certain lines then 
another person who behaves as I do must also think along the same lines.  A theory of 
mind is absolutely essential for communication, social cooperation and the building of 
community in which altruism flourishes. Corballis demonstrates that this capability is 
unique to humans.  The pattern of time travel in humans arises because of the following 
line of thought: if action A has led to my successfully achieving goal B, then organising 
things so that I can take action A again will once more lead to B.   Theories of mind and 
time travel, then, entail recursive thinking and therefore demonstrate its presence. When 
this conclusion is coupled to his premise that thinking determines the nature of language 
and not the other way around, Corballis arrives at the conclusion that our language is 
recursive and hence is generative, as claimed by Chomsky.  
 In addition to the main theme of the book, Corballis also provides new arguments 
for his long-held position that human language began through gesture and hand signals 
rather than through vocalisation.  Although he provides some fascinating new evidence 
here, this is mainly a sidebar to his central thesis.  He also summarises the latest findings 
in the evolutionary chain that led to the emergence of our species, adding his own spin on 
the data. Beyond biological evolution, his treatment of human development also 
incorporates cultural and linguistic adaptation.  Corballis also applies his notion of 
recursive thinking to explain the evolution of technology, which I consider an important 
new addition. 
 So far I have tried to summarise what the reader will encounter in reading 
Corballis’ fascinating new book.  As a reviewer I am also obliged to provide a critique, 
however.  Let me begin with a personal note and a caveat as to my objectivity.  I felt 
honoured to be asked to review this book, a request I attribute to the fact that I am the 
author of another book that deals with the origin and nature of language – The Extended 
Mind: The Emergence of Language, the Human Mind and Culture – in which I develop 
the thesis that language is an emergent phenomenon that arose as a form of 
conceptualisation needed to deal with the complexity of hominid life as we developed 
tools and learned to control fire.  Being given this assignment, however, did create in my 
 
3 
‘recursive mind’ a concern that I might have a conflict of interest, since my narrative 
differs from that of Corballis.  I could not pass up the opportunity, however, because of 
the great respect I have for someone whose work I became acquainted with by reading 
his many texts and by listening to his many presentations at the Evolang Conferences. 
McLuhan’s figure/ground notion teaches us that a figure can only be understood in terms 
of the ground in which it operates.  I cannot escape the ground of my own thinking on the 
nature and origin of language. But having warned the reader of my bias I now feel free to 
juxtapose my thoughts with those of Corballis.  
 As noted, Corballis argues that language is a product of our thinking – not the 
reverse, as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis would have it.  I do not find a conflict between 
these two positions, because I see the relationship between thought and language as a 
non-linear one – together they form a complex adaptive system in which language 
emerges in terms of words acting as and representing concepts.  These concepts give rise 
to thoughts, which, in turn, lead to new words: language and thought thus bootstrap each 
other into existence in a recursive manner.  Here I am employing the author’s notion of 
recursiveness to refine my own ideas about the relationship of language and thought. 
Corballis’ introduction of recursiveness into the conversation is a major contribution; it 
rivals those of Chomsky, Deacon, Christiansen, Tomasello and Jackendoff, my heroes in 
the field.  I do believe, however, that his project would benefit from the inclusion of the 
ideas coming from emergence theory as developed at the Santa Fe Institute and 
elsewhere.  
 Corballis begins his book with a rather mathematical description of recursion and 
gives one the impression that he is dropping the idea into the discussion of language and 
the human mind in some deus ex machina fashion.  It seems somewhat arbitrary at first, 
but as one reads further its importance becomes apparent.  His writing style is lucid, well-
researched, makes numerous references to the scientific literature – and is also 
entertaining, with literary allusions ranging from nursery rhymes to Shakespeare.  I 
particularly enjoyed the way in which Corballis makes use of sports metaphors.  While 
concerned to explain his ideas to a broad audience, he also addresses the needs of 
scholars in the field. 
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 Corballis argues, as I do, that the emergence of language is not a strictly 
biological phenomenon: it is also ‘deeply bound to culture’ (p. 82).  I find it curious, 
therefore, that he later writes that ‘tools are of course important to the human story but 
there is little evidence that they were decisive in creating the human mind’ (p. 206). 
Given that tools are part of culture, and given that culture played an important part in 
creating language which arose as a result of human thought, it would seem to follow that 
tools do play a role in the creation of the human mind.  
 Although I do not agree entirely with all of Corballis’ positions, I do subscribe to 
most of them. More importantly I admire the way in which he formulates issues worth 
thinking about, which alone makes his contribution very valuable. I am happy to 
recommend this book to both lay readers and experts in the field. 
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